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Merit Selection: A Review of the Social
Scientific Literature
Malia Reddick*
I.

Introduction

As one judicial selection scholar noted, "It is fairly certain that no
single subject has consumed as many pages in law reviews and lawrelated publications over the past 50 years as the subject of judicial
selection."' Central to the judicial selection debate is the appropriate
balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability.
Generally, judicial independence refers to the common law tradition of a
judiciary that is institutionally immune from outside political pressures in
the resolution of individual cases, whereas judicial accountability
comports with democratic principles and allows the judiciary to be
responsive to changes in public opinion. Lifetime appointment systems
are said to ensure judicial independence; popular elections at frequent
intervals are favored by those who value judicial accountability.
The so-called "merit plan" for selecting judges was introduced in
the 1930s as a means of promoting both independence and
accountability. Merit selection calls for gubernatorial appointment of
judges from a list of names submitted by an independent nominating
commission. After a brief period in office, judges run in retention
elections where only one question is posed to voters-should the judge
be retained in office. In addition to balancing judicial independence and
accountability, merit selection systems are said to produce highly
qualified judges, since candidates are screened by nonpartisan
commissions.
*
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A large body of social scientific research has developed that seeks
to evaluate the claims made by proponents of merit selection.
Specifically, researchers have examined the extent to which nominating
commissions insulate judicial selection from the political process,
whether retention elections make judges accountable to the public, and
whether merit-selected judges are distinguishable from judges selected
through other means. I consider that research here, summarizing the
qualitative and quantitative studies that have attempted to measure the
actual effects of merit selection of judges.2
This review takes three parts. In the first two, I consider the key
features of merit selection systems-judicial nominating commissions
and retention elections. In the third part, I compare the products of merit
systems--4he judges themselves--to the products of other selection
systems.
II.

Judicial Nominating Commissions

Allan Ashman and James Alfini describe judicial nominating
commissions as "the cornerstone of the merit selection plan.",3 Empirical
research has focused on two aspects of judicial nominating commissions:
the extent to which commission members and their nominees reflect the
diversity of the larger community and the role of politics in the
nominating process.
A.

Diversity andJudicialNominating Commissions

Because the composition of judicial nominating commissions may
affect who the nominees will ultimately be, three major studies have
explored the gender and racial diversity of these commissions. In 1973,
Allan Ashman and James Alfini surveyed members of nominating
commissions in thirteen states.4 Beth Henschen, Robert Moog, and
Steven Davis conducted a similar survey of nominating commissioners
in thirty-four states in 1989. 5 The most recent study of the racial and
gender makeup of nominating commissions was conducted by Kevin
2. The reader will note that much of the empirical research on merit selection
systems was conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The reason for this is that
fourteen states had adopted merit plans by the end of the 1970s, so that assessing the
effects of merit selection was particularly relevant during this time. See Henry R. Glick
& Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems andJudicial Characteristics:The Recruitment of
State Supreme CourtJudges, 70 JUDICATURE 228 (1987).
3.

ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION:

THE NOMINATING PROCESS 22 (1974).

4. Id.
5. Beth M. Henschen et al., Judicial Nominating Commissioners: A National
Profile, 73 JUDICATURE 328, 334 (1990).
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Esterling and Seth Andersen, who gathered demographic
information on
6
nominating commissioners in eight states in the 1990s.

In the first major study, Ashman and Alfini found that nominating
commissioners were overwhelmingly white and male. More specifically,
nominating commissioners were 97.8 percent white and 89.6 percent
male. 7 This study also compared the characteristics of lawyer and nonlawyer commissioners. Only two of 194 lawyer members were nonwhite, and only one was a woman. 8 Of the 153 9lay members, 3.3 percent
were non-white, and 22.3 percent were women.
Sixteen years later, Henschen, Moog and Davis reported notable
gains in the representation of women on judicial nominating
commissions.' 0 Twenty-five percent of commissioner respondents were
women, and the percentage of women among attorney commissioners
had increased to 10 percent. 1 This study showed only slight increases in
the proportion of minority commissioners, with 7 percent of
commissioners being non-white. 12 As in the Ashman and Alfini study,
there were fewer minorities among lawyer members, 5 percent, than lay
members, 14 percent. 13 The Henschen study also reported significant
variation in the racial and gender composition of nominating
commissions across states. 14 This variation was later confirmed in the
data collected by Esterling and Andersen. 15 States with a significant
proportion of Hispanic commissioners included New Mexico, at 30.9
percent, and Arizona, at 25.8 percent, while states with substantial
African-American representation were Tennessee, at 20 percent, and
Florida, at 18.1 percent. 16 The extent of gender diversity on these
commissions ranged from 22 percent in Alabama to nearly 47 percent in
Tennessee. 17
Esterling and Andersen examined the effects of gender and racial
diversity within nominating commissions on the gender and racial
diversity of applicants and nominees. In the five states for which data
was available, there was some evidence that diverse commissions
6.

Kevin M. Esterling & Seth S. Andersen, Diversity and the Judicial Merit

Selection Process: A Statistical Report, in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 1999 (Am.

Judicature Soc'y ed., 1999).
7. ASHMAN & ALF1NI, supra note 3, at 38.
8. Id. at 38-39.
9. Id.
10. Henschen et al., supra note 5, at 330.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 329.
13. Id. at 330.
14. Id.
15. Esterling & Anderson, supra note 6, at 24-25.
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at25.
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18
attracted more diverse applicants and selected more diverse nominees.

B.

Politicsand Other ExternalInfluences in the Nominating Process
1.

Politics

Nominating commissions represent an attempt to reduce or
eliminate the influence of partisan politics in the selection of judges. The
Ashman and Alfini study summarized state efforts to insulate nominating
commissions from political pressures. 19 Some states require the
appointing authority to make commission appointments without regard to
political affiliation. 20 Other states mandate partisan balance among
commission members and restrict the political activities of sitting
commissioners. 2' Many states also limit the number of consecutive
terms that commissioners may serve and preclude commissioners'
eligibility for judicial office for a period of time after their service.2 2
A substantial body of research exists on the extent to which politics
plays a role in the selection of members of nominating commissions and
the decisions that they make. The most comprehensive study in this
regard is the Richard A. Watson and Randal C. Downing study of the
Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan. 23 According to this study, political
influences were present in the selection of both lawyer and lay
commissioners. 24 Lawyer commissioners were elected in a competitive
"two party" system, where plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants' lawyers
each sought to elect like-minded colleagues to the nominating
commissions and thus to promote the selection of judges who would
protect their clients' interests.25 Politics also figured in the appointment
of lay commissioners, who tended to be from the same political party as
the governor. 26
The Henschen study discovered extensive political activity among
nominating commissioners prior to their selection. Two-thirds of the
commissioners belonged to civic organizations, more than one-fourth
served in a party office, and nearly one-third held public office.27 Lay
18.

Id. at 24-28.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 3, at 70-79.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 73.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 19-48.
Id. at 20-43.
Id. at 43-48.
Henschen et al., supra note 5, at 331-32.

RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF BENCH AND
BAR (1969).
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commissioners were particularly active, with 33 percent having served in
a party office and 24 percent having held public office.28 According to
Henschen, the extent of political involvement among commissioners
"raise[d] the somewhat troubling spectre of political favoritism.' 29
Watson and Downing also presented evidence of political influences
in the selection of nominees by the commissions. 30 Their study
documented various forms of "panel stacking" and "logrolling."
"Panelstacking" occurs when a commission submits a combination of
nominees to the governor that offers no real choice. 3 1 "Logrolling"
describes a situation in which individual commissioners
or groups of
32
nominees.
another's
one
support
to
agree
commissioners
Studies have shown that politics not only plays a role in the
selection of commissioners but also in their deliberations. Two studies
have gauged the opinions of nominating commission members regarding
the role of politics in their deliberations. Ashman and Alfini reported
that approximately one-third of the commissioners surveyed believed
that political considerations were introduced in their deliberations and
that they had at least some influence on their decisions.33 The
commissioner responses from four states, accounting for over 75 percent
of the respondents, revealed an interesting distinction. In Colorado,
where commissions must be bipartisan, only 15 percent of respondents
felt that politics affected their decisions. 34 In Iowa, Florida, and
Maryland, where partisan balance is not required, between 37 percent
and 41 percent of respondents believed that political considerations
influenced their decisions. 5
In another study, Joanne Martin questioned the chairs of nominating
commissions in thirty-four states and the District of Columbia.36 Slightly
more than half indicated that political considerations entered into their
deliberations at least "infrequently" and that they were of at least "some
37
importance."

28. Id. at 332. These findings regarding lay commissioners contrast with those of
Watson and Downing, who reported that lay commissioners participated heavily in civic
and social organizations but were not involved in political activities. See WATSON &
DOWNING, supra note 23, 44-45.
29. Henschen et al., supra note 5, at 334.
30. WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 23, at 101-11.
31. Id. at 107-08.
32. Id. at 109-11.
33. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 3, at 75.
34. Id. at 76-77.
35. Id.
36.

JOANNE MARTIN, MERIT SELECTION COMMISSIONS: WHAT Do THEY Do? How

EFFECTIVE ARE TI-EY? (1993).

37.

Id. at 20-22.
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Other External Influences

Researchers have explored other external influences on the
nominating process, including bar associations. Many of the attorneys
interviewed for Watson and Downing's study of the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan indicated that the Plan "had not eliminated 'politics'
but merely had substituted Bar politics and gubernatorial politics for the
traditional politics of party leaders and machines. 38 Ashman and Alfini
examined a variety of ways in which bar associations may influence the
composition and deliberations of judicial nominating commissions and
suggested that this was a fruitful avenue for further research.39
In 1990, Charles Sheldon surveyed leaders of state bar associations
regarding their organizations' involvement in judicial selection. 40 In
states where the bar elects lawyer members of judicial nominating
commissions, the bar leadership appoints lawyer commission members,
or the bar nominates or recommends lawyers to the governor to be
appointed to nominating commissions, state bar leaders believed that the
bar was, at a minimum, fairly effective in influencing judicial selection.41
Bar leaders were less enthusiastic about bar efforts to affect judicial
elections,
including committee recommendations to the public and bar
42
polls.

III. Retention Elections
Retention elections were introduced as a compromise between those
who wanted to insulate the judiciary from political pressures and those
who wanted the judiciary to remain responsive to public concerns.
Empirical studies of judicial retention elections have explored
determinants of voter behavior in retention elections, the effectiveness of
efforts to inform voters about the performance of judges standing for
retention, and the extent to which retention elections ensure judicial
accountability.
A.

Voting Behavior in Retention Elections

Much of the research on judicial retention elections has been
conducted by Larry T. Aspin and William K. Hall, who have collected

38.
39.

WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 23, at 258.
ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 3, at 79-85.

40. Charles H. Sheldon, The Role of State Bar Associations in JudicialSelection, 77
JUDICATURE 300 (1994).

41. Id.
at 301-02.
42. Id.at 302-03. Interestingly, bar polls in partisan elections were rated as more
effective than those in nonpartisan elections.
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and examined data on retention elections in ten states between 1964 and
1998. Between 1964 and 1998, only fifty-two of 4,588 candidates in
judicial retention elections were not retained by voters.43 The average
affirmative vote has ranged from a high of 84.7 percent in 1964 to a low
of 69.4 percent in 1990. 44

Hall and Aspin attributed variations in

affirmative vote rates over time at least in part to changes in levels of
political trust.45
Researchers have also explored other influences on voter decisions
in judicial retention elections. A recent study of voter behavior in
judicial elections demonstrated that retention elections are not immune
In states
from partisan politics and other contextual forces. 46
characterized by competitive party politics, supreme court justices
received fewer votes in favor of retention. In states where the murder
rates decreased, affirmative votes declined,47 suggesting that voters held
accountable justices who were up for retention.
There is also some evidence that voters fail to differentiate among
judges on the same ballot. For example, judges in the same district
received very similar proportions of affirmative votes. 48 In addition,
voters within a judge's home county tend to take stronger positions on
the judge, either for or against, than do non-home county voters.49
Voters are also slightly more likely to vote to retain a judge in
presidential election years than in non-presidential election years.5 °
One factor that does not appear to be correlated with voter decisions
in retention elections is the race of the judge. A study of retention
elections between 1980 and 1990 found that there were only slight
differences in the proportion of affirmative votes received by white,
black, and Hispanic judges.5 '
Voter rolloff in judicial retention elections, or voters who cast

43. Larry Aspin, Trends in JudicialRetention Elections, 1964-1998, 83 JUDICATURE
79, 79 (1999).
44. Id. at 80.
45. Id. at 79; see also William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of
JudicialRetention Election Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340 (1987) [hereinafter Hall];
Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, PoliticalTrust and JudicialRetention Elections, 9 L.
& Pol'y 451 (1987).
46. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probingthe
Myths of JudicialReform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315 (2001).
47. Id. at 324.
48. See Hall, supra note 45, at 346; Aspin, supra note 43, at 81.
49. See Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, The Friends and Neighbors Effect in
JudicialRetention Elections, 40 W. POL. Q. 703 (1986); see also Hall, supra note 45, at
346.
50. Hall, supra note 45, at 344.
51. Robert C. Luskin et al., How Minority Judges Fare in Retention Elections, 77
JUDICATURE 316 (1994).
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ballots in other electoral contests but do not vote in retention elections,
has declined over the years and reached an all-time low of 29.5 percent
in 1998.52 While rolloff is not affected by whether it is a presidential
election year, there is less voter rolloff in close retention elections,
defined as elections where the judge receives less than a 60 percent
affirmative vote, than in non-close elections.53 Other studies have shown
that voter rolloff in retention elections for judges of major trial courts is
positively related to the size of judicial districts; as the size of the district
increases, so does the number of voters who do not participate in
retention elections. 4
B.

Bar Polls and Other JudicialEvaluationPrograms
I.

Bar Polls

Bar associations, which are active in the initial selection of judges in
many merit plan states, may also play a role in judicial retention. Many
state and local bar associations have developed polls and other evaluation
techniques to assess the performance of judges seeking retention.
Studies of the effectiveness of bar association activities in informing
voters, and of the influence of poll results on voter decisions, have
reached mixed conclusions.
Some researchers have examined the extent to which voters are
aware of bar evaluations of judicial candidates. Kenyon N. Griffin and
Michael J. Horan reported that only 12.8 percent of voters in Wyoming's
1978 judicial retention elections had any knowledge of the state bar's
poll. 55

Similarly, a study of bar evaluations of judicial candidates in

Texas revealed that fewer than 8 percent of voters had received
information from any legal source. 56 Contrary evidence is provided by
Joel H. Goldstein, who found that voters in a 1977 Kentucky judicial
primary election ranked a bar poll as second only to "personal
knowledge" in terms of importance as a source of information. 7
Other studies have examined the influence of bar-sponsored
evaluation programs on voter decisions in judicial retention elections.
52. Aspin, supra note 43, at 81.
53. William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, The Roll-Off Effect in Judicial Retention
Elections, 24 Soc. Sc. J. 415, 422-23 (1987) [hereinafter Hall, Roll-Of]].
54. See Hall, supranote 45, at 347; Hall, Roll-Off supra note 53, at 420-21.
55. Kenyon N. Griffin & Michael J. Horan, Merit Retention Elections: What
Influences the Voters?, 63 JUDICATURE 78, 85 (1979).
56. Charles A. Johnson et al., The Salience ofJudicialCandidatesand Elections, 59
Soc. Sci. Q. 371, 377 (1978).
57. Joel H. Goldstein, Bar Poll Ratings as the Leading Influence on a Non-partisan
JudicialElection, 63 JUDICATURE 377, 382 (1980).
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John Scheb found no evidence that the Florida Bar Advisory Preference
Polls conducted in 1978, 1980, and 1982 had a significant impact on
voter decisions.5 8
William Hall, however, concluded that "bar
evaluations of sitting jurists do affect the outcomes of retention
elections" in Illinois; 59 in judicial retention elections from 1964 to 1982,
nearly every negative bar evaluation resulted in a lower mean affirmative
vote for the judge being evaluated.6 °
James H. Guterman and Errol E. Meidinger suggested that the
absence of a relationship between poll results and voting behavior may
be due to the way the results are disseminated. 61 They described two
models of bar association activities with respect to communicating the
results and recommendations of bar polls. Taking a "public service
approach," bar associations simply provide poll results to the media and
the public.62 Using a "special interest approach," bar associations try to
secure a particular result.63 Guterman and Meidinger identified only four
bar associations of the fifty they studied who actively campaigned on
behalf of candidates they favored, providing advertising and funding.64
Studies of the influence of bar polls on the outcomes of the 1976
and 1978 retention elections in Maricopa County, Arizona, seem to bear
out the Guterman and Meidinger hypothesis. William Jenkins noted that,
in Maricopa County's 1976 retention elections, the three judges with the
lowest bar ratings were retained by voters by substantial margins,
suggesting that voters were either unaware of or unconcerned about bar
poll results. 65 John A. Stookey and George Watson, however, reported
that the Maricopa County Bar Association's 1978 poll increased voter
awareness of judges on the ballot and even "influenced some voters to
oppose the retention of some judges." 66 Stookey and Watson noted that
the Maricopa County Bar released its 1976 poll results without
recommendations or follow-up activity, while, in 1978, the Bar actively
campaigned against the three judges who had received low ratings, using
58. John M. Scheb, II, Is Anyone Listening? Assessing Bar Influence on Merit
Retention Elections in Florida,67 JUDICATURE 112 (1983).
59.

WILLIAM K.

HALL, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS: Do BAR ASSOCIATION

POLLS INCREASE VOTER AWARENESS? 16 (1985).

60. Id. In Illinois, judges are initially selected in competitive, partisan elections;
they run in retention elections for subsequent terms.
61. JAMES H. GUTERMAN & ERROL E. MEIDINGER, IN THE OPINION OF THE BAR: A
NATIONAL SURVEY OF BAR POLLING PRACTICES (1977).

62.
63.
64.

Id. at 8-10.
id.
Id. at 45-48.

65. William Jenkins, Jr., Retention Elections: Who Wins When No One Loses?, 61
JUDICATURE 79, 83-84 (1977).

66. John A. Stookey & George Watson, Merit Retention Elections: Can the Bar
Influence Voters?, 64 JUDICATURE 234, 241 (1980).
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paid newspaper advertisements, printed material that was distributed to
the public, and a speakers' bureau discussing the poll and its
recommendations.6 7
2.

Other Judicial Evaluation

Six states that utilize merit selection to fill both initial and interim
vacancies have established official, state-sponsored, judicial performance
evaluation programs to provide voters with objective information on the
performance of judges standing for retention. 68 Kevin M. Esterling and
Kathleen M. Sampson evaluated the effectiveness of these programs in
four states, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Utah, in making information
available to voters and the extent to which the evaluations influenced
voter decisions. 69 The percentage of exit survey respondents who were
aware of judicial evaluation commission reports ranged from 15.2
percent in Phoenix to 40.2 percent in Salt Lake City. 70
Among
respondents who were aware of the reports, between 13.8 percent in
Denver and 26.8 percent in Phoenix based their decisions solely on the
evaluations, and between 39.3 percent in Phoenix and 62.5 percent in
Denver indicated that their voting decisions were helped by this
information. 71 In addition, an analysis of the relationship between
judicial ratings and election outcomes in Alaska from 1976 to 1996
showed a positive relationship between ratings and affirmative votes.
While state-sponsored evaluation programs are viewed as a valuable
means of enabling voters to make informed choices, some have
72
questioned the methods, accuracy, and fairness of these programs.
Esterling and Sampson reported that nearly half of the Utah judges
whom they interviewed felt that the evaluation commission did not
accurately measure their on-the-bench performance. 73 In addition, they
discovered that judges' assessments of the fairness of these programs
seemed to depend on the opportunity that they were given to respond to
67. Id. at 240-41.
68. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Utah.
For a description of these programs, see Seth S. Andersen, JudicialRetention Evaluation
Program,34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1375 (2001).
69. KEVIN M. ESTERLING & KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION
EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1998).
70. Id. at 36.
71. Id. at 39.
72. For a discussion of similar concerns with respect to bar evaluation polls, see
Errol E. Meidinger, Bar Polls: What They Measure, What They Miss, 60 JUDICATURE 469
(1977); Steven Flanders, EvaluatingJudges: How Should the Bar Do It?, 61 JUDICATURE
304 (1978); Theodore C. Koebel, The Problem of Bias in JudicialEvaluation Surveys, 67
JUDICATURE 224 (1983).
73. ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 69, at 44.
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the commissions' findings.74 Perhaps most significantly, more than onefourth of evaluated judges believed that the evaluation process
undermined their independence as judges.75
C.

Retention Elections andAccountability

Judicial retention elections were intended to introduce an element of
accountability to judicial appointment systems, but some observers have
charged that retention elections insulate judges from popular control. A
study of retention elections from 1942 to 1978 revealed that only thirtythree judges were not retained. 76 Of the thirty-three unsuccessful judges,
approximately 75 percent were opposed for significant reasons, with the
most common reason being that they lacked professional competence.7 7
In two-thirds of the cases in which judges were not retained, they were
opposed for more than one reason. 78 The organized bar, the public, and
the press also played a role in these judges' failed bids for retention. 79 Of
the thirty-three judges who were not retained between 1942 and 1978,
nineteen (58 percent) were the subjects of public campaigns to remove
them from office.80 In addition, sixteen of the thirty-three received
negative bar evaluations, 8 and fifteen received exclusively unfavorable
editorial comment in the newspapers.
Susan B. Carbon used these findings to assert that "retention
elections are a useful tool for holding judges accountable, especially in
urban areas, where the bar, the press and citizen groups can make the
public aware of those judges they believe to be unqualified for office. 8 3
Jenkins, however, disagreed. Examining retention elections held in
1976, he found that only three of 353 judges were rejected by the voters,
84
in many cases in spite of unfavorable bar ratings .
Jenkins described
judicial retention elections as "merely a rubber-stamp approval of
incumbent judges."8 5
In a 1991 survey of judges who had recently stood for retention,

74. Id. at 43.
75. Id. at 44.
76. Susan B. Carbon, JudicialRetention Elections: Are They Serving Their Intended
Purpose?, 64 JUDICATURE 210, 221 (1980).

77. Id.
78. Id. at 221-23.
79. Id. at 229-32.
80.
81.

Id. at 230.
Id. at 229.

Interestingly, six of those thirty-three judges received positive

evaluations. Id.
82. Id. at 232.
83. Id. at 233.
84.

Jenkins, supra note 65, at 80.

85.

Id.
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Aspin and Hall addressed the issue of retention elections as a means of
accountability. 86 Three-fifths of the judges who participated in the
survey indicated that retention elections have a pronounced effect on
their behavior on the bench.87 While a small minority, almost 14 percent,
believed that retention elections give judges independence from voters,
the remaining judges perceived themselves as responding to their
environment. 88 Nearly 28 percent of responding judges reported that
retention elections made them more sensitive to their environment,
almost 12 percent felt that they motivated them to do a good job, and
nearly 6 percent believed that they improved their judicial performance.8 9
When asked about the most effective thing judges can do to win a
retention election, more than half of the respondents mentioned
competent judicial performance. 90
IV. Comparisons of Merit Selection with Other Selection Systems
A number of scholars have addressed the question of whether meritselected judges differ in significant ways from judges selected through
other means. Comparisons of the products of judicial selection systems
have focused on three dimensions: gender and racial diversity,
background characteristics, and behavior on the bench. 9'
A.

Gender and Racial Diversity

What influence, if any, the method of judicial selection has on the
success of women and minorities attaining judgeships is a point of
contention between those seeking to diversify the bench and those who
advocate merit selection. Proponents of a diverse bench argue that merit
selection prevents women and minorities from reaching the bench by
entrenching a system dominated "by state and local bar associations

86.

Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior,

77 JUDICATURE 306 (1994).

87. Id. at 312.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 312-13.
90. Id.at 314.
91. While many judges initially reach the bench via appointment, even in elective
states, most studies of variations across selection systems focus on formal methods of
judicial selection. One noteworthy exception is a study by Barbara Graham, who
examines the relationship between judicial selection methods and the degree of black
representation on state trial courts. Barbara Luck Graham, Do JudicialSelection Systems
Matter? A Study of Black Representation on State Courts, 18 AM. POL. Q. 316 (1990).
While there is no correlation between formal methods of selection and racial distribution
on the bench, blacks are more likely to be selected through appointment, whether formal
or informal, than through election. Id. at 331. Unless otherwise noted, the results
discussed in this section are based on formal methods of selection.
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whose members overwhelmingly are white, male, Protestant,
conservative 'establishment' attorneys. ' 9 2 Some empirical studies of the
relationship between judicial diversity on state courts and judicial
selection methods validate this assertion.9 3 At the same time, several
studies find no correlation between selection method and diversity, 94 and
others show a positive correlation between merit selection and the
diversity of the bench.9 5
The most recent study of selection systems and judicial diversity
finds no evidence that women and minorities are more likely to become
state appellate judges under merit systems than they are under non-merit
systems.96 Their findings indicate that the proportion of minorities
selected under merit systems was slightly less than the proportion of
minorities on state courts nationwide.
B.

Other Background Characteristics

In addition to comparing the race and gender of judges chosen
through various selection systems, researchers have also examined other
judicial characteristics such as political and legal experience, education,
religious affiliation, and localism. 97 The most recent and comprehensive

92. Glick & Emmert, supra note 2, at 230.
93. See, e.g., GARY S. BROWN, CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTED VERSUS MERITSELECTED NEW YORK CITY JUDGES, 1992-1997 (1998) (examining women and minority
judges in New York City from 1992 to 1997).
94. See, e.g., Nicholas 0. Alozie, Black Representationon State Judiciaries,69 Soc.
ScI. Q. 979 (1988) (examining the number of blacks on all state courts); Nicholas 0.
Alozie, Distribution of Women and Minority Judges: The Effect of Judicial Selection
Methods, 71 SOC. SCI. Q. 315 (1990) (examining the numbers of women, blacks, and
Hispanics on all state courts); Nicholas 0. Alozie, Selection Methods and the Recruitment
of Women to State Courts of Last Resort, 77 Soc. ScI. Q. 110 (1996) (examining the
number of women on state courts of last resort).
95. See, e.g., M.L. HENRY, THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES tN ACHIEVING
JUDICIAL OFFICE (1985) (examining the numbers of women and minorities on all state
courts); Karen L. Tokarz, Women Judges and Merit Selection Under the Missouri Plan,
64 WASH. U. L.Q. 903 (1986) (examining the number of women on Missouri courts);
M.L. HENRY, CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTED VERSUS MERIT-SELECTED NEW YORK CITY

JUDGES, 1977-1992 (1992) (examining the numbers of women and minority judges on
New York City's Civil, Family, and Criminal Courts from 1977 through 1992).
96. Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on State and
FederalAppellate Benches: A Cross-Time Comparison, 1985 to 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84
(2001).
97. Several scholars have cautioned that regional forces may also contribute to
variations in judicial characteristics, so that regional factors should be taken into account
when comparing the effects of judicial selection systems. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon,
The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of
Judges-Reconsidered, 6 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 579 (1972); Philip L. Dubois, The
Influence of Selection System and Region on the Characteristicsof a Trial Court Bench:
The Case of California,8 JUST. SYS. J. 59 (1983); Glick & Emmert, supra note 2.
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study of the relationship between judicial backgrounds and selection
98
systems was conducted by Henry R. Glick and Craig F. Emmert.
Analyzing all sitting high court judges in 1980 and 1981, Glick and
Emmert found few differences in terms of qualifications between judges
identified through merit plans and judges chosen through other systems.
Merit-selected judges did not have more legal or judicial experience than
judges chosen by other means, and they were just as likely as other
judges to have had partisan political careers. 99
In terms of education, more judges chosen through merit plans went
to prestigious law schools than did judges who were elected, although the
authors caution that the numbers are small. 100 In addition, merit plans
were less likely than other systems to place religious minorities, defined
as low-status Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, on the bench.' 0 Finally,
local ties, in terms of whether judges were born in-state or educated instate, were less important for merit-selected judges than for elected
judges. 102
C. JudicialBehavior and Performance
One of the earliest studies of behavioral differences between meritselected and elected judges was conducted by Watson and Downing for
trial court judges before and after Missouri adopted a merit selection
system in 1940. They found no evidence that merit plan judges were
more or less likely than elected judges to favor the plaintiff in personal
injury litigation, and they extended this finding to conclude
that these
03
judges did not differ in their general ideological stances.'
More recent analyses of the decision-making of merit judges versus
elected judges have revealed no important differences between the two
98. Early studies of variations in judicial background characteristics across selection
systems were conducted by Herbert Jacob, The Effect of Institutional Differences in the
Recruitment Process: The Case of State Judges, 13 J. PuB. L. 104 (1964) (examining
characteristics of supreme court and major trial court judges in twelve states in 1955);
WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 23 (comparing characteristics of trial court judges
selected before and after Missouri adopted a merit plan in 1940); Canon, supra note 97
(examining characteristics of state high court justices sitting between 1961 and 1968);
STUART S. NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED JUDICIAL SYSTEMS (1973)

(comparing backgrounds of elected and interim-appointed judges on state supreme courts
in 1955); and Larry L. Berg et al., The ConsequencesofJudicialReform: A Comparative
Analysis of the California and Iowa Appellate Systems, 28 W. POL. Q. 263 (1975)
(comparing characteristics of appellate judges in Iowa and California at six different
points in time).
99. Glick & Emmert, supra note 2, at 232-33.
100. Id. at 231-32.
101. Id. at 233-35.
102. Id. at 231-32.
103. WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 23, at 324- 2 6.
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groups, whether regarding supreme court support for various categories
cases, 10 5
of litigants,10 4 trial court sentencing in driving-while-intoxicated
1 06
or supreme court rulings in racial discrimination cases.'
A number of studies have failed to distinguish between merit
systems and other appointive processes and have simply made
comparisons between appointed and elected judges. Some of these
studies have discovered marked discrepancies in the decisionmaking of
appointed and elected judges, 10 7 while others have revealed no significant
differences in their behavioral tendencies.'0 8
In addition to assessing the decisional tendencies of merit-selected
and elected trial court judges, Watson and Downing also compared the
performance of these judges. Based on attorney evaluations of these
judges' overall performance, the authors concluded that a merit plan
"tend[ed] to eliminate the selection of very poor judges." 10 9 While large
proportions of both merit and elected judges were ranked in the highest

104. Burton M. Atkins & Henry R. Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and State
Supreme Court Decisions, 2 AM. POL. Q. 427 (1974).
105. Jerome O'Callaghan, Another Test for the Merit Plan, 14 JUST. SYs. J. 477
(1991).
106. Francine Sanders Romero, David W. Romero & Victoria Ford, The Influence of
Selection Method on Racial DiscriminationCases: A Longitudinal State Supreme Court
Analysis, in 2 RESEARCH ON JUDICAL SELECTION 17 (Am. Judicature Soc'y ed., 2002).
107. See, e.g., Gerald S. Gryski et al., Models ofState High CourtDecision Making in
Sex Discrimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143 (1986) (showing that state supreme court
decisions upholding sex discrimination claims were more likely to occur in appointive
states than in elective states); Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts
Comparatively: The View from the American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5 (1995)
(concluding that the influence of judicial selection system on decisions in death penalty
cases depended on the extent of partisan competition in the state-in states where
partisan competition was high, elected justices were more likely to vote in favor of the
death penalty, while appointed justices were more likely to oppose it); DANIEL R.
PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT

POLICY: INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY (1995) (reporting that appointed judges
tended to favor the individual over the state in criminal procedure cases, and were more
likely than elected or legislatively selected judges to introduce new policies in business
law cases); Andrew F. Hanssen, The Effect of JudicialInstitutions on Uncertaintyand the
Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD.
205 (1999) (finding higher litigation rates in appointed state high courts than in elected
high courts).
108. See, e.g., NAGEL, supra note 98 (examining the judicial behavior of elected and
interim-appointed judges serving on the same state high courts); Ronald Schneider &
Ralph Maughan, Does the Appointment of Judges Lead to a More Conservative Bench?
The Case of California, 5 JUST. SYS. J.45 (1979) (comparing the liberalism of the
California Supreme Court before and after gubernatorial appointment replaced partisan
elections in 1935); John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, JudicialPolitics, Death Penalty
Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465 (1999)
(comparing the propensities of partisan-elected appellate judges with other appellate
judges to uphold death sentences).
109. WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 23, at 283.
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quartile, fewer merit judges were ranked in the lowest quartile.
V.

Conclusion

This review of social scientific research on merit selection systems
does not lend much credence to proponents' claims that merit selection
insulates judicial selection from political forces, makes judges
accountable to the public, and identifies judges who are substantially
different from judges chosen through other systems. Evidence shows
that many nominating commissioners have held political and public
offices and that political considerations figure into at least some of their
deliberations. Bar associations are able to influence the process through
identifying commission members and evaluating judges.
In addition, support for the effectiveness of retention elections in
holding judges accountable to the public is limited. Judges rarely fail in
their bids for retention, and approximately one-third of those who cast
votes in other races do not vote in retention elections. There is some
evidence, however, that judicial evaluation programs are effective in
informing and influencing voters.
Finally, there are no significant, systematic differences between
merit-selected judges and other judges. Some evidence suggests that
merit plans may place fewer racial and religious minorities on the bench.
The finding that merit plans may prevent the selection of bad judges is
noteworthy, but this appears to be an isolated result.
Lest this review be interpreted as a call to abandon merit selection, I
would suggest an additional criterion on which judicial selection systems
should be judged--their impact upon the public's trust and confidence in
the courts. By this standard, merit selection is preferable to judicial
elections. As we saw in the 2000 judicial elections in states such as
Alabama, Michigan, and Ohio, campaigning for office can transform
judicial candidates into ordinary politicians, giving sound bites and
raising campaign funds. Judicial elections tend to politicize the judiciary
in the eyes of the public.'l 0 To foster the appearance of an independent
110. The results of two recent national surveys support the assertion that judicial
elections jeopardize public trust and confidence in the courts. In a 1999 survey
commissioned by the National Center for State Courts, 75 percent of the respondents
agreed that having to raise campaign funds influences elected judges. NATIONAL CENTER
FOR

STATE

COURTS,

HOW

THE

PUBLIC

VIEWS

THE

STATE

COURTS,

http://www.ncsc.dni.us/PTC/results/results.pdf (May 14, 1999). According to a national
poll conducted in 2001 in association with the Justice at Stake Campaign, 76 percent of

voters believed that campaign contributions made to judges have at least some influence
on their decisions, and more than two-thirds felt that "individuals or groups who give

money to judicial candidates often get favorable treatment." Letter from Stan Greenberg,
Chairman and CEO, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, and Linda A. DiVall,
President, American Viewpoint, to Geri Palast, Executive Director, Justice at Stake
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and impartial judiciary, we need a system that emphasizes judicial
qualifications, opens the process to all who meet the legal requirements,
and in most instances, eliminates the need for political campaigning.
Merit selection is such a system.

Campaign (Feb. 14, 2002), at http://www.justiceatstake.org/content Viewer.asp?bread
crumb=5,268.

